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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
In November 1974, Plaintiff filed suit in the 
District Court of Iron County, Utah, for "specific per-
formance" of a purported 1970 "agreement for exchange" 
of desert grazing land acquired by Plaintiff and his wife 
in May 1970, for State Normal School trust-fund land on 
SUIIllllit Mountain; but at the time of trial on April 5, 1978, 
the Court urged the parties to recess and to work out a 
settlement agreement. They did and an Exchange Agreement 
dated June 2, 1978 resulted. Thereafter, the legal and 
factual disputes arose concerning that agreement. The 
basic issue tried on April 30, 1979 was whether each tract 
had been appraised for its highest and best use market 
value, and whether the appraisal was or was not otherwise 
adequate to meet' the terms of said agreement. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
On September 6, 1978, Defendants filed a Motion to 
have the conditional Exchange Agreement dated June 2, 1978, 
adjudged null and void (a) for failure to have the State 
trust-fund land appraised for its highest and best use 
market value; (b) also by reason of material errors of fact 
in the appraisal report of Ken w. Esplin dated May 26, 1978· 
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which would allow Plaintiff to be unjustly enriched by 
acquiring State trust-fund land without adequate considera-
tion; and (c) on the ground that Plaintiff had failed to 
perform as required. 
On September 15, 1978, Plaintiff's counsel filed 
a Counter-Motion for an Order to Compel the State of Utah 
to convey title to the State land, to which Motion the 
Attorney General served objections and also denials of 
Plaintiff's Affidavit on September 25, 1978, 
After a trial on April 30, 1979 before Honorable 
J. Harlan Burns, District Court Judge, at Parowan, Utah, 
the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendants to convey 
title to the State land, was granted and the Motion of 
Defendants was denied. 
NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Appellants seek reversal of the District 
Court judgment whereby the State of Utah was required to 
convey to Plaintiff and to his wife the State land described 
in said judgment, and to remand the case to the District 
Court for the purpose of having the court ascertain the 
relative values of the subject properties in order to carry 
out the intent of the parties unless Plaintiff then elects 
to dismiss this cause. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff and his wife acquired in May 1970 a 
tract of desert land in western Iron County, Utah described 
as Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and S 1/2 N l,/2 of Section 1, T. 33 s., 
R. 19 w., SLM, (329 acresj, hereinafter referred to as 
Parcel No. 1, which Plaintiff orally offered in exchange 
for State trust fund land on Summit Mountain, described 
as NW 1/4 and W 1/2 NE 1/4 of Section 33, T. 35 S., R. 
9 w., SLM, in Iron County, Utah (240 acres}, hereinafter 
referred to as Parcel No. 2. Plaintiff alleged that the 
Department of Natural Resources on June 5, 1970, "approved" 
an exchange subject to recommendation of the Attorney 
General that after examination of abstract o£ title, Plain-
tiff was found to have a marketable title. (Doc. U}. 
For reasons not now relevant, Defendants refused 
to carry out the alleged agreement and this suit was the 
result. It was filed on November 11, 1974, 
In settlement of the suit, the parties entered 
into the Exchange Agreement dated June 2, 1978. Pursuant 
thereto, the appraiser referred to therein, one Ken W. Esplin 
appraised the properties and his appraisal dated May 26, 197! 
was received in evidence over Defendants' objections as Ex-
hibit "7A." The facts which form the basis of Defendants' 
objections to said appraisal will be set forth in the course 
-3-
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of the argument and will not be set forth here to avoid 
duplication since it is sufficient at this time to note 
that Defendants objected to said appraisal on the same 
grounds in the trial court that they do here in this appeal. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VALUE 
OF THE STATE LAND WAS THE VALUE STATED IN 
THE ESPLIN APPRAISAL. 
The Esplin appraisal was so grossly inadequate that 
it could not properly support the court's finding of value 
because (1) it was based on facts admittedly erroneous as 
to the existence of both water and water rights on the State 
property; (2) it treated the State land as landlocked, even 
though it acknowledged the existence of a platted subdivision; 
(3) it failed to consider comparable sales because of the rnis-
understanding of the physical characteristics of the State 
property as to water and access referred to above. Also, the 
appraiser believed the Gardner sales (some of the comparables) 
were ~ water when in fact they were not. 
While the parties had agreed that the exchange of 
Plaintiff's land for State land should be made, it was clear 
that the basis of valuation of the two tracts of land should 
be made on the basis of the highest and best use of each 
tract. [Transcript April 5, 1978, p. 19, (R. 15, p. 19)]. 
-4-
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II 
Although the Esplin appraisal (R. 17) stated that 
There is also a subdivision adjacent to the east side 
of Parcel No. 2 [i.e. State land] that has had some activity,, 
the subdivision has a fairly good spring that is for the 
use of the property owners. " (p. 5} and that 1'. • • Parcel 
No. 2 is completely dry and has no possibility of getting 
water at the present time. 11 (p. 6) The evidence was clear 
that the State property had a spring with a flow of water 
which varied somewhat, but that it never dried up. 
Plaintiff admitted on cross-examination (Transcript 
April 30, 1979, R. 29 pp. 49-50, 52-54, 57} that he was awan, 
of the water on the State land. Crystal testifie_d (R. 29, pp 
82-83) that in the fall when he was on the State land there 
was a flow of about 15 gallons per minute and there was prett, 
much permanent water on the property. Halterman testified 
(R. 29, pp. 113-117) that he was familiar with the State prof 
erty and that on the average the flow was 100-l75 gallons per, 
minute and that he had never seen the lake dry. Finally, 
Gardner, one of the owners of the subdivided tract referred 
to in the Esplin appraisal, testified (R. 29, p. 120} that sa:. 
of lots or small tracts were made to the buyers without wate: 
rights. 
Some confusion may have existed in the court 1 s mind' 
to the importance of the water. The State 1 s attorney sought 
-5-
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to explain that the State had acquired title to the land 
in 1901 and had a diligence right to the water since title 
predated 1903 (R. 29, p. 150). 
THE COURT: Is there anything in the agree-
ment that would include water? 
MR. REIMANN: The agreement specified it had 
to be appraised for its highest and best use, and 
that would automatically include water rights. 
THE COURT: It would? 
MR. REIMANN: Yes. 
THE COURT: In other words, am I to under-
stand that in trading property with the State of Utah, 
this witness, the plaintiff, would receive water? 
Don't you have to file on water and prove up on your 
claim? Doesn't all the water in the State of Utah 
belong to the State subject to appropriation? 
MR. REIMANN: Yes. But under the statute, 
your Honor, if the State had given a deed to this 
property or a patent, as they ask, it would carry 
all appurtenant water rights. And that's why it's 
important when it comes to the determination of value. 
That's why it's important. So we'd like to offer in 
evidence Plaintiff's Exhibit 13-A. 
MR. PARK: We object, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I am going to overrule your ob-
jection, and receive it for what weight it has. 
I don't understand the law, Mr. Reimann, to be to 
the effect that you say it is. That if the State 
trades land to a private individual, that he gets 
the water; I don't know that's right. I would 
understand the law to be to the effect that he 
must file and appropriate under the State Engineer's 
auspices that may be subject to appropriation. That's 
the way I would understand the law. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13-A received in evidence.) 
THE COURT: All right, next question. Mr. Park, 
you are on your feet, do you have something? 
-6-
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MR. PARK: Well, we object to the questions 
concerning water as being irrelevant, your Honor. 
In the agreement, it says, that we get the land, 
but it doesn't say whether we are getting water 
or not getting water. It wasn't communicated to 
the appraiser whether we were getting water or not. 
And whether we get it or not is going to be a de-
termination that would have to be --
THE COURT: So you object to it? 
MR. PARK: Yes, Sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Reimann wants 
to give you water, and you object to it? 
MR. PARK; No, Sir. 
THE COURT: I am going to sustain the ob-
jection. I am going to sustain your objection. 
Let me ask you this, does your statement bind the 
State Engineer's office? 
MR. REIMANN: Oh, yes, because the State 
Engineer takes everything -- he's bound by the 
statutes. 
In response to questions from Plaintiff's attorney, 
Crystal explained what a diligence claim is, and explained 
the process necessary to a change of use from livestock water, 
ing to domestic use. (R. 29, pp. 105-107) A discussion then 
followed which led the court to state (p. 108): 
THE COURT: No use wasting time on that; 
the State of Utah owns all the water in this State, 
and people have a right to use it as determined by 
the State Engineer's office •. 
It is obvious that whether or not a tract of land in 
Utah or any other arid western state has water or the abilitY 
to secure water is extremely important to the determinationo 
its value for almost any conceivable use. 
-7-
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A further reading of the Esplin appraisal (p. 9) 
shows that while Esplin was aware of sales or lots or small 
tracts of the "Gardner" subdivision at " ••• upwards of 
$1,000 per acre .•• " and that the Gardner tract " 
all accessible , " he treated such sales as not com-
parable to the state property. " ••• Parcel No. 2 [i.e. 
State land] is very inferior to the sale adjacent to it, 
having no more than one-third of the property presently 
usable for speculative purposes and with no water and no 
apparent possibility of getting water." (Emphasis added.) 
is 
It must be assumed that Esplin either did not know 
or did not understand that the Gardner tracts were sold 
without water rights. It is also rather obvious that Esplin 
felt that water availability was a necessary preliminary to 
sale of lots or small tracts. 
Additionally, the Esplin appraisal would indicate 
that there is no road access to the State tract, although 
the existence of a platted subdivision street is acknowledged, 
(p. 6). 
While Gardner was not familiar with the water on the 
adjoining State land (R. 29, p. 121), he was familiar with 
the State property since 1963, and stated (p. 122) that part 
of the State property would be very similar to the property 
this group acquired. Some of the property acquired by Gardner 
was rather steep and similar to part of the State land. There 
-8-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was a dedicated fifty-foot road to the State property 
since 1971 as required by the County Commission. There 
were no subdivision improvements on the Gardner property 
except some rough-cut roads, (p. 124), and except for the 
extreme southeast part, cutting the roads was just a matter 
of pushing over some trees, (p. 125). 
In response to questions by the Plaintiff's at-
torney and by the court (pp. 128, 129), Gardner testified 
that a platted roadway crossed his property [i.e., between 
the State property and the County road] and that the trees 
had been pushed over, that it was a road like others in the 
subdivision, but the fence into the State property hadn't 
been let down because nobody wanted it done at the time. 
It is also clear that Plaintiff was aware of the 
dedicated fifty-foot road. Plaintiff owned land adjoining 
the State land (R. 29, p. 34), and was aware that land ad-
joining the State land had been purchased in 1963 or 1964 
for development of summer home sites (p. 38) , knew that Elm£ 
Lowe had offered $100.00 an acre for the State's 240 acres 
in 1970 (pp. 39, 40), was a County Commissioner when the 
County required Gardner to dedicate the road (p. 43), and 
knew that the road had been dedicated on the date the Esplir 
appraisal was made, (p. 48, 49). 
It further appears that the Plaintiff went to the 
State property with Esplin at the time when Esplin made his 
-9-
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appraisal (R. 29, pp. 56, 57). It would appear that Plain-
tiff failed to communicate the knowledge he had of the State 
property to Esplin. 
It may be that the court understood the problem to 
be that the State wished to draw into question the integrity 
of Esplin or the Plaintiff, (R. 24, p.4). The objection to 
the Esplin appraisal is that at least three important factors, 
water, access and comparable sales, were misunderstood by 
Esplin and the result was an inadequate or mistaken conclusion, 
namely, that all of the State property was without water or 
the possibility of water, without access to the County road 
as a practical matter, and useful only for grazing. 
It is noteworthy that the court seemed to think that 
the State should have " • . • to cross-examine Mr. Ken Esplin 
and examine him as thoroughly as you want to, also for pur-
poses of impeaching your own selected appraiser •• n (R. 
24, p. 4) The court, prior to its ruling, also commented 
that Esplin was in court but neither party called him, (R. 
25, p. 139). The court found nothing in the testimony lead-
ing it to believe that Esplin had made his appraisal other 
than in accordance with the standards required by a land ap-
praiser. (R. 25, p. 140) The court treated the Crystal ap-
praisal as simply a different opinion as to highest and best 
use. It is respectfully submitted that the court ignored 
-10-
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the facts while deciding that Esplin's integrity was 
above reproach. 
While the State acknowledges that this court does 
not sit to weigh evidence, it is respectfully submitted 
that the evidence in this case shows conclusively that 
the Esplin appraisal, and the trial court's findings based 
on that appraisal, are simply unsupportable. 
The Crystal appraisal (Exhibit 15 A) fairly de-
scribed 100 of the State's 240 acres as comparable to the 
Gardner property, described water on the State land, de-
termined the fact that the Gardner tract sales were without 
water rights, noted the need to regrade the dedicated road 
across the Gardner property, and properly compared actual 
sales of like property. Crystal also concluded that 140 
State acres had a present value only for grazing. No testi· 
mony was adduced· to contradict the Crystal judgment of valu: 
The Crystal appraisal and the testimony of the wit· 
nesses made it clear that Esplin did not know the facts. 
His opinion as to value cannot stand. 
POINT II 
THE ESPLIN APPRAISAL WAS INADEQUATE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
In determining the fair cash market value of land, 
-11-
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there should be taken into account all considerations 
that might fairly be brought forward and reasonably be 
given substantial weight in negotiations between the owner 
and a prospective purchaser.!/ While each parcel of real 
estate may be unique because of exclusive physical location 
upon the earth's surface, the test is whether there is 
reasonable comparability between the tracts. The ter.m 
"comparable" or "similar" cannot mean "identical," but 
if there is a reasonable basis for comparison between prop-
erties, evidence of sales is admissible.~ 
Without undue repetition of the statements made 
in Point I, it is obvious that "comparables" of the State 
property and the Gardner property were either unknown to 
or missed by Mr. Esplin. Since Mr. Esplin did not testify, 
the court had only the appraisal report.' In view of the 
other testimony, it is quite clear that Mr. Esplin treated 
the Gardner property and sales reflecting value improperly. 
Most courts have held that comparable sales are the 
best evidence of value.lf Such evidence can be given directly 
~/ 
State Highway Commission v. Superbuilt Mfg. Co., 204 
Ore. 393, 281 P.2d 707 ll955). 
State v. Peek, 1 Ut.2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 ll953); ~ 
Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Ut.2d 317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969); 
City of Evanston v. Piotrowitz, 20 Ill.2d 512, 170 N.E.2d 
569 (1960). 
United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1309 (lOth 
Cir. 1974); United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87 (lOth 
Cir. 1966). 
-12-
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or used to support the testimony of the appraisal witness, 
Since the Esplin appraisal has heretofore shown 
to be defective by lack of comparable sales, rnisinterpreta· 
tion of sales (inclusion of water rights on Gardner acreag1 
sales when no water rights were involved), and erroneous a: 
surnptions as to water on the State tract, there is no rnark1 
data which is reliable. 
The Gardner tract is adjacent. Subdivision work 
amounted only to dedication and rough-blading of access roa 
Plainly this property is comparable with the State propert) 
It is not a comparison of raw land with a sub-division of 
city property with utilities, paved roads, sidewalks and 
other urban conveniences. 
Since Esplin's underlying assumptions, based appar· 
ently on information or misinformation supplied by Plaintif 
are wrong (water, access and possible usage), the conclusic: 
as to value must equally be wrong. 
There are only three main ways of establishing lane 
value. These are (1) comparable sales or market value; (2) 
costs less depreciation; and (3) capitalization of income~ 
proach. It is apparent that the courts approve the first t< 
as the best evidence of value}../ Since the Esplin Appraisal 
does not attempt to use either of the other two appraisal 
techniques (and we agree that they are inappropriate 
Note 2, supra, of Latille v. Housing Authority, 280 A.2c 
98 (R.I. 1971); u.s. v. 3,698.63 Acres of Land, 416 F.2c 
65 (8th Cir. 1969); State v. O'Neal, 150 So. 2d 608 (Ct. 
App. La. 1963) 
Salt Lake County v. Kazura, 22 Utah 2d 313, 452 P.2d 8 6 ~ 
(!969). 
-13-
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here) we need not determine whether an attempt has been 
made to use only one approach when others might be ap-
propriate.Y 
In short, Mr. Esplin has attempted to give an 
appraisal based on market value when he has missed critical 
physical conditions on the State land relating to water and 
to access, and has failed to compare value of an adjacent 
tract of land because of misunderstandings as to conditions 
of sale of smaller otherwise comparable acreage. 
POINT III 
IF ARGUENDO, THE COURT CONSTRUED THE STIPULATION 
AS AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND THE ESPLIN APPRAISAL 
AS AN ARBITRATION AWARD, IT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEN-
DANT'S MOTIONS TO DECLARE THE EXCHANGE AGREEMENT, 
OR AT LEAST THE ESPLIN APPRAISAL, VOID. 
Section 78-31-16, u.c.A. 1953, states that an arbitra-
tor's award shall be set aside if the court finds: 
(3) any other misbehavior by which 
the rights of any have been prejudiced; 
or 
(4) the arbitrators .•• so imperfectly 
executed them (i.e. their powers} that a mutual, 
final and definite award upon the subject matter 
submitted was not made. 
Defendant's motions were supported by the affidavits 
of Mark H. Crystal, a professional appraiser (who testified} 
~I Salt Lake County v. Kazura, 22 Ut.2d 313, 452 P,2d 869 
(1969). 
-14-
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and Charles R. Hansen, the former Director of the Division 
of State Lands. A copy of each affidavit is appended to 
this brief. 
Although the court did not expressly deny said mo-
tions, it is implicit in the court's directing the plaintif 
to go forward with his proof that the motions were implied! 
denied at the commencement of the trial before any evidence 
was introduced. This was error. In passing on a motion to 
vacate an award, where the motion is supported by affidavit 
which have not been denied or controverted, the court must 
accept as true the facts stated in the affidavits.~ 
The court received the Esplin appraisal ·into eviden 
over Defendant's objection without foundation evidence ofa: 
kind, and without testimony from Mr. Esplin. 
It is respectfully submitted that, assuming admis-
sibility of the appraisal, that the assumptions stated int 
appraisal report are so contrary to the facts in evidence, 
that the conclusion as to land value had to be in violatior. 
of an arbitrator's duty to ascertain facts and reach a fair 
decision based on the facts. Without restating the argumer 
heretofore made, Defendant was not asked to supply in format 
Bivans v. Utah Land, Water and Power Co., 53 Utah 60L 
174 P. 1126; Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 15 P.: 
353; c. f. Frazier v. Ford Motor Co., 364 Mich. 648, 11. 
N.W.2d SO (citing Giannopulos at p. 85). 
-15-
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to the appraiser. Plaintiff took it upon himself to 
take the appraiser to the site and to either misinform 
the appraiser or to avoid giving vital information to the 
appraiser. Under these circumstances, there was a failure 
of the "arbitrator" to meet the standards of fairness re-
quired by law. 
CONCLUSION 
T.he Esplin appraisal is insufficient as a matter of 
fact and as a matter of law to support its conclusion as to 
valuation of the lands sought to be exchanged. While its 
admission into evidence over objection and without testimony 
is questionable, its stated assumptions are simply incorrect, 
and the ultimate conclusions are therefore not supportable 
by the evidence. The lower court therefore committed error 
in relying upon the conclusion. 
Appellant prays that the Judgment of the District 
Court be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to 
properly determine the value of the tracts in question. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
-16-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two copies of the fore-
going Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Michael Wallace Park, Attorney for Respondent, 110 
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ss. 
County oi Sa 1 t Lake 
~l,,RK H. CRYSTAL. being first duly svmrn, deposes and says: For more 
than 18 years have been a professional appraiser of lands l'lithin the 
State of Utah. I reside at 1288 North l·iain Street, Farmington, Utah. 
am a graduate of Utah State University, Logan, Utah, having ~ajored in 
range management ,.,;th a Bachelor of Science degree in Range l·lcnagement. 
I taught vocational agriculture for five years. took forrroal courses in 
rural property appraising. I am a member of the American Society of Farm 
:·lanagers and Rural Appraisers, and also the Utah Society of Farm and Ranch 
r·1anagers and Appraisers. Since l955 I have a8praised nuPJero•Js farr:~s a"1d 
ranches in the State of Utah. I have been a consultant on r:ing2 ar: fr:,.:::":,.. 
matters for Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation. 
During the past 18 years I have appraised more than 1200 ~racts of 
land for various agencies of the State of Utah, including the Division of 
State Lands. have also made land appraisals for irrigation companies, and 
for various lai·J firms in Utah. I have been called as an expert witness on 
land values and as an appraiser in condemnation cases in courts in Utah. 
On August 23, 1g73, I was requested by '.<illiam K. Dinehart, Director 
of the Division of State Lands in the Depart".ent of Natural Resources, cf 
the State of Utah, to make an appraisal of the market value according to the 
highest and best use as of June 10, 1971, of the following described State 
land situated in Iron County, State of Utah: 
Tm·mship 35 South, Range 9 1/est, Salt Lake i·leridian 
Section 33: iH·Jl.i, W.2iiE 1.:> ( 240.00 acres) 
On August 30, 1978, I made a preliminary appraisal of said land and 
made a report accordingly to the Division of State Lands, but not a final 
appraisal o1·1ing to the fact that on August 30, 1978, I was unable to obtain 
any records of comparable sales in the area in relation to the date of 
June 10, 1?71. Conseauently, I made a very conservative preliminary 
aoora1sal for the date of June 10, 1971, before making a final appraisal 
after : c·Juld Jbta1r in:'"or~ation an:J S'Jpoor::ing information of sales in the 
3. rea of 
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Fnr 
~ C I ·~ 
~=·I ;.L 
In vie•.·/ o7 the fact tnot or• ;}ugT;-r: 
nary examination, 
the area, 1 based rr, apf]n"~Jl •)n tr,~ c:ssr:c 
any sales; but ',·Jith a •;ie•,l of further ::t._;:r 1·ln.r~onn, arr: 111/<:-St:;;':.·ror· t<; 
determine 1·1hat comparable sales actJally ,.,:_.,-~ ·:',J~e o·;::r· d pensd of :ir:-:, 
... ,ric1 'dOulc 1r~clu~e June l='· 1~71. 
Tf1e State lanG in question ·,,as appra1s'?c~ 
11irreral rights of any klr·i, bu~ 81th all rn1nerals e.xclurjed. 
use 11:11 ch the pro~ertj can be put. 
used for li'Jestock grazing 1n the past, but I ·.1as infonreJ t'l:.~ lanes 
cont1guous on :he East of :he State lao;C 'rc1 ~E:er. subd1·nde-: ,:-o,- s:.Jrier 
horr.e Sites a fev; ;ears a;;o 
The subject land is 1:-:...a~e'J a~out 11 rrnles from Paro~·1an, Utah. There 
is a county rocd off from the rs-c(:l to Cerjar Sr<::a~s. Sa1d count; road ?Oe: 
to the Dry Lakes area near Snan He3.c~. Snaii HeJJ i::: .; st:1 .-essr: ~ . :;ca~e~ 
about 3!, to 4 ~iles farther up canyon frJm th1s land. This land area h2s 
been designated as "Sur:-r1i':. ~· 1 ounta1r" 
tion, I estimatetj that tr,e ma1n co:...nt_,r roa:j. ·,.,·r:·c~ 15 ~a~ntal'"'·E·j t·; :,..c .. 
County, comes 1-1ith~n 200 .... eet of the State land. On .:I.Jgv_;t >J, 197~, l 
:Ja<; rtot able to det:.er:-r1ne def1n1t~lJ ·.·JhethfC',.. ~here {/as ':.,le'l ,;;n:; :Jubllc 
right-of-1·1ay frc.11 ':he :ra1n cJV1t/ roac ever to the S~at-: lar.<:. 
On the State "end there are aspe'lS and CJfll""ers r:>r' --:ne s:•wes 1·nr:~1 
a panor-arTic vie'.'' of ?;.r:J',·Jan '/.Jllr:.;. -:-her<:> also is a s~,r1rs Sfl tr·.e n0rth-
oarO':ian '.'a:ley. 
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gollons per minute. There is a diligence cla1n of ~re :tate of _":.:_r, 
associated '··1ith ~his spring. The ele•1ation of this land is a~pro:<inately 
9500 feet at its highest point. I estimated that 60 percent of this land 
slopes t01·1ard Summit Creek. lhe a'Jerage annual precipitation is repartee 
to be 20 inches. There is some privately O\·med land aajacent to the 
State land on the East, intersected by the r..ain county road. There is 
also a spring on the adjacent land to the East of the subje':t land. 
At the time of my preliminary appraisal •c~ithout the benecit of sales 
made in the area, I concluded that the State land or a substantial portion 
thereof while used in the past for grazing purposes, 1r10uld be usable for 
summer home sites as 1·1ell as controlled livestock grazing. 
returned to Parov1an on September 6, 1978, and reexarined ':he State 
land in the lignt of additional information. I also made 1nquiries as to 
subdivisions and sales of subdivided land on the East side of the State 
land, in preparation for the final appraisal report for the Division of 
State Lands. 
I have no personal interest in the subject-matter, and my compensa-
tion does not depend on the dollar amount of the appraisal made. 
On the 15th day of September, 1978, I obtai ned a certified copy of 
the minutes of a meeting of the Board of County Commissioners of Iron 
County, Utah, held April 14, 1971, •.·1hich recites under the caption of 
SUBDIVISIOrl: 
l~r. llatt Bulloch, Cedar City Engineer, met "ith the Board 
and presented the following subdivision plats for approval: 
2. Green ~·!eado'o'l Acres, Units 2, 1 ocated in and being a 
part of Section 33, T<~p. 35 South, Range 9 \/est, SLB&I·!. 
The Corr.missioners, observing that the "OK" of the Planning 
CofTirnission, the County Engineer, and the County Attorney, had 
heretofore been obtained; by 1'·lotion duly passed, 1·1hich 'rJas maGe by 
Commissioner Ivan~~. Matheson, and seconded by Commissioner D. 
Robinson, granted their approval subject, ho~rJever, to access on 
subdivision nuober 2, being 1·1idened to fifty feet. 
-3-
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t ~-~ access 
of the S~ate lan:r J.nd the .s:·. of 
33, (1·1hlcn adJolnS on the South siCe Jf ~'le SL:<e lane), cs · ..-l 1 1 ::.s :ne 
of Section 31, To•::nship JS Sout:l, Pun9e 9 ,_..rest, Salt La~.e >'.;:.iJi:J.'l 
From inquiries made of p-=·Jple in ~arJ';IJn Jr-: Cedor Cit:- l_'tah, par-_:c.,. 
larly from and after Septembel' 6, 1978, I le:Jrr.ej that tr.ere had be~'l a 
numtet of sales of land on contract 't1hich did not find rec:~-d~-:J in u-~ ,..,.: 
of the County Recor·der of Iron Cuunty, Utah. found that sales hac! beer, 
of privately ov1red lands for surrr.;er horne s~:es and for recr--::::.~ion::!l uses, 
1·1ithin an area of a haif mile t0 the East and vtitflin a 1-,alf ii'~le to :r,e 5"·,· 
of the aforesaid State land. 
ha·:e not been able to ascer-tain all of the sales filade in those ar~:;s 
SOiile of the sales hav1ng be~n made in areas 1·1hich beca[T]e s·Jbc!blsions cf 
lands~.-· ,Jr in dBtacter to tile State land. The follm1ir.g c~r·e sor:1e of ~h:; 
sales ·.·1n1ch I have been able to identify to date, rrcde in -::h~ areas adjacen· 
or nearly adjacent to the State land hereinabove described. rn 1'10ne of tr·,:; 
sales which I l'las able to identify '(las there any sale of 1r1ater rights: 
A. On or about June 30, 1959, qobert L. Gardner, Trustee, sold under 
1-1ritten contract to .A.lma D. Jones and Beulah :-1. Jones, of ParO':tan, Utah, a 
tract of 8.04 acres for the sum of $4,964.70, the purchase price of s0id 
3.04 acres a1nounted to $617.50 per acre, described as follo1·1s: 
Commencing at a point ilorth 1170.95 feet and ':'lest 959.93 
feet from the South quarter corner of Section 33, Tovmshio 35 
South, Pgnge 9 fiest, Salt Lake :~eridian, aod r8nning thence 
South 89 37' East 97§.15 feet; thence llorth I 28' fiest 3EJ.Ol 
feet: thence South 89 59' \·lest 969.51 feet; thence South 0 
353.10 feet along an old fence to the point cf beginning. (',,li~hin 
a third of a mile from the South boundar"y of ~he State land). 
also learned that 1·1ithin the past year a S'Jrrrr.er ho~e has been pal'-
tially construct<::d on said land so purchaseJ, although the contract 1-j::_:: 
yet been paid in f 1Jll.· I am alsc informed that a rough roar:i v:as c·J: fr:-
the county road by a bulldozer sh:Jrt~y after the purcha~e ·.-.. as "":3Ge, an1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
than one daj to cut. 
S. 3; •.-1ritten contrac;: da'l.ed ~·Jr.e 3~·. '1359, said Po:-2rt L. Garc!n'2r' 
as Trustee, sold to Clarence L. Stutbs and Ce:Jnn Stubbs, his 1·1ife, 5.73 
acres of land in Green l~ead0\·1 Acres, Unit I, in Section 33, To•.mship 35 
South, Range 9 \·lest, Salt Lake l~eridian, in Iron County, State of Utah, for 
the sum of 53,737.50, amounting to $652.25 per acre. Said land is east:rl 
from the State land. 
C. By 1·1ritten contract on or about September 30, 1969, scid Robert 
L. Gardner as Trustee, sold to James D . .'·lontgomery and l~ary A. i·1ontqor.Jery, 
his l'life, a tract of 5 acres for the sum of 53,250.00 or S650.00 per acre, 
the follooling described tract of land situated in Iron County, Sta~e of 
Utah: 
Beginning at a point North 0° 19' f/est 942.64 feet from the 
Southeast corner of Section 33, T01-mship 35 Sou~h, Range 9 ':Jest, 
Salt Lake Meridian, gnd running thence South 89 59' •,:es: 538.83 
feet; thence >'!orth 4 58' East 138.13 feet; thence along 8 915.47 
foot radius curve to the left 122 50 feet; thence North 2 42' 
Hest l5iJ.l8 feet; thence North 89° 59' East 529.33 feet; thence 
South 0 19' East 413 feet to the point of beginning. (Said land 
is less than a half mile southerly from the State land.) 
D. By •.-witten contract dated •'larch 10, 1971, Green l·lead0\·1 Acres, a 
partnership, by Ben A. Baldl'lin, Partner, sold to Howard L. Stubbs and 
Elna H. Stubbs, his wife, as joint tenants, for the purchase price of 
S4,400.00, Lots 16 and 17 in Block 0, of Green ~leado>~ Acres, in Section 
33, Toomship 35 South, Range 9 •,.Jest, Salt Lake i·!eridian, >~hich land consist' 
of 5.42 acres or $811.80 per acre. 
E. By written contract dated August 14, 1972, Green l·lead01·1 Acres, 
a partnership, sold to 1/illiam L. Hardy and Shannon A. Hardy, his l'life, 
Lot 6 of Block B, Unit I, and Lot 2 of Block C of Unit II, totaling 1.619 
acres for a purchase price of $4,800.00 or $2,964.78 per acre. Said land 
is •t~ithin Green 1•1eadmts Acres, Units I and II, in Section 33, Township 35 
South, Range 9 •,.Jest, Salt Lake i·leridian. According to my calculations, said 
land is 1·1ithin one-half mile from the East line of the State land. 
-5-
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;:: ~ . . . ' ,'"' 
General's of~1ce t·1at 21.: le2st c ~cr·: en o7 said '•··a"c:er c-::Jl~ ~), crJn.·-:··>' 
to dvr:est1C US2. ·:ot·:n'thStJndlnS ~;,e :later' \!':'U:·J ·;,we t:J ::: riJ ·::·:::2 _,_ 
dence 1n l1tu~a~10n elsev1here in 1~1 ta". ".as lr.c,::atec: th-'!::. s,nr,~cr obn;:; ~· 
names 1 n the rrounto in a teas do no: use Tore ~.'lon : !JQ a a 11 on-:. o.: ':12. ~er pc·· 
c!ay on an average; :hat one gallon of fl0\11 per· minute 3r'ount:s to l,..!..lQ 
gallons per day, so that four g3llons ;:er r"'lnute 'Jt' 1·2s:, :"o.r~ ')r~.::-~.a~f -::'":~ 
reputed flO\'J of the spnng on tf:e State 1-=.'lG, if con·Jer .. ced ~o :c.~e::;t1C 
use, \·1ould be sufficient to sup;:.tl; j7 s·J:-::.-;;er cab1ns or hor1es, '::;' 1-]2·;~nr: 
s:on'='2 >:anks at -::he nighest elevation of use 
There are aspens and coni~~rs on tne St?te larC:, ·,,hic.'l .Taf-e it 
desiri:ltlo:- r7;:,r surr,i'er hOTTieS and ::aJ1r-.s ar.d for recreil.tlon.J.l us.:: ~on,e cf 
the 'J<::oc-.e in ParO\·Jcn reported t'lc~ sno• .. ·mob1l1n~ on that area ~-<as 1ncre~s~·: 
in pop•J?arity as a 1.-r:nter· recreaticn in addition tc s~1in9 a: ~n·an .--ieaj 
farther up canyon. 
The l-1arket Data 3.pproach util~zes sales of cxr'pdrable propenj ~:J 
estimate the value of +:he subject propert:t. ihe sutJect proper~:; has ':e=" 
aopraised and the est~ITated value per acre c!et:E:"""T'lne-: by 'JSlng tr'le ~.'ariet 
Data ~pproach. 
The subject pro~erty consists of a s:-ooth ar-~a and a slopin~ are~ 
which slooes ~~,est· .... ar-:J. -:-he appraisal clas:;·,fl·~= the su~:cc~ ~r~:;;n_. 
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st~ep and gr::!d•J.;I s1ooing lc.r.c ,ne ai):Jr·alset- ::as 'Jne:bl~ to lao·:.~ dec.·.:-
co"'lpare 1·1ith the 140 acr<?s. Therefore, a range value for t;raz~ng only ''1as 
assigned to the 140 acres. 
ft.creage values of land in the proximity of the subject ;::>roperty 
indiCate a continued up1·1ard trend. 
On the basis of the :-larket Oata Approach in esti~ating the value of 
the subject property, and giving full consijere.tion to tile foregoing 
facts and after analysis of the comparable lanes described, it is tre 
opinion of the appraoser that the 11arkec Value of the State land on June 
10, 1971 VJas as follo1·1S: 
l 00 acres $500.00 per acre 
140 acres @ S 60.00 per acre 
Total Estimated '/alue 
$50,000.00 
s 8,400.00 
$58.400.00 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 19th day of September, 1978. 
r~y Cor.Jni~sion Expires: 
ll-27-81 
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:ss. 
COU!CY OF S~L': LAKE ) 
AIT!DAVI':' OF C?J.RL=:s R. HAti5~, Itl C!V!L ::o. 
6666, in the District Court o!' Iron County, Utah 
C!!A!U.SS R. W~SEN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I reside in Salt Lake County, Utah. am a member of the Utah State 
Bar, engaged in the practice of law. For over ten years prior to July l, 19?8, 
I was the duly appointed, qualified and acting Director of the Division of State 
Lands, Department of Natural Resources of the State of Utah. I Bl!l the Charles R. 
?.ansen who was named as a defendant in the capacity as Director of the Division 
of State Lands in Civil No. 6666 in which D. Robinson was plaintiff, and the 
State of Utah, Department of Natural Resources, Division of State Lands, was the 
principal defendant, in the District Court of Iron County, State of Utah. Said 
suit was filed in November 1974. I becar::1e familiar with said suit from its Yery 
inception. am familiar with the controversies which preceded said suit: The 
claim that D. Robinson was entitled to obtain title to State trust fund land in 
Iron County, Utah, consisting of the NWl' and Y/l'.m:l. of Section 33, Township 35 
South, Range 9 West, Salt Lake Meridian, without payment of any money to the 
State, but merely by exchanging land consisting of Lots l, 2, 3 and 4, and the 
SYzN'/7 of Section l, '!'ownship 33 South, Range 19 West, Salt Lake Meridian, with-
out any valid appraisal of the State land for its highest and best use. 
2. I BD not familiar with either parcel of land. Beginning sometime 
in 1970, D. Robinson had a number of conversations with me about the subject 
State land which is trust fund land. On at least two occasions he appeared 
be!ore the Board of State Lands, asking that an exchange be consummated. S:e 
spoke to me in my office at tlle State Capitol Building between 1970 and 1973. 
He told me that he was o.uite familiar with the State land in question, and that 
it had no other value except as grazing land. Lands under grazing leases pro-
duc~~n most cases the lowest income of any lands held under State leases. 
In 1971 Paul E. Reimann, assistant attorney general, was assigned to do the 
legal work for the Division of State Lands. With his approval I had changes I!IB.de 
in .5tate grazing leases to contain a clause that the gra1.ing lease could be 
ter:::inated at the end o: any year. ~hat wa.s to enable the Division of State 
l..a.."'!:is to obtain other leases providi!'lg greater revenue than grazing leases, also 
to sell tte sur!"ace estate a:ter appraisal of the su::"face estate for the 
( ~) 
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highest and best use, and o'ttai::. the h:,r.est cc:::t:etitive b1::! 1:" e-::L:<!:.. ~ ...... 
excess of the appraised marKet value, i: other11ise acceptable. 
3. During e~y adl:l.inistration as Director of the :>1visio:J. o!'" State lands, 
there were a number of instances when individuals and even State age!lcies 
applied for State lands for less than the appraised value for the highest and 
best use. fo'..r. neimann orally and in writing counseled that the D:vision of .State 
Lands &ll:i the 3oard of State Lands have the highest duties of care of trust fun1 
lands and the duty to obtain the hi;hest revenue and in case o! transfer o! title, 
the highest value which would have to be not less than the appraisal of the land 
for its hi'-hest and best use, not for its lowest possible use. ',/e turned down 
proposals made by State legislators and by State officials and State agencies. 
Mr. Rei!tlann and I relied on the 1967 decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Lassen v. Arizona, ex rel Arizo!le. :-!.ighway Dent., 385 U • .3. 458. :n 
that case the Arizona :-:ig:hway Department souc;ht to condemn State trust fund land 
for highway construction without payment of MY cot:~pensation to the trust fund 
under the theory that State highways constructed across trust fund lan:.s always 
enhanced the values of the trust fund lands. The Supreme Court of Arizona ruled 
in favor of the !!ighway Departcent. However, the Supreme Court of the United 
States reversed the Arizona Supreme Court and held that no trust fund lands could 
be sold for less than its appraised value, and that any other disposition would 
be a breach of trust. In a 1919 decision the Supreme Cou:-t of the United 
States in Ervien v. United States, 251 U. S. 41, declared that actual compensation 
in money must be paid to the trust equaling the appraised value. 
4. Some time after complaints were oade to the Attorney General by people 
in Iron County that there were irregularl..ties in the atte!!l?ts of D. Robinso!l to 
obtain the State land in question for land he acquired as tax title land, s~id 
Paul E. Reimann, as assista"lt attorney general, was assigned by the Attorr.ey 
General to conduct an investigation of the co:n':llaints and to ascertain whether 
there had been compliance with the State statutes relatint; to exchanGes of State 
lands and the decisions o! the courts. I know that after co:1si-:!erable ti:Je ar.d 
effort to get the facts, during whi::~ he con:erre::l wit;>) me on n'J"'erc'Js occaslcr.s, 
he advised l:le as rh!"ector t:'1at t!'le:-e neve:; ha::! bee:1 a:.:1 a':':l:"::!.isa:;. o:' ":.~.e State 
land fo!' lts hi€hest and best use, 9:.-: ':hat ":::.e re::-'!.se:-.':~":.:0:1.'3 -:d.e '::l -::e ::::.-
~. Robinsor: to the e::ect t!-:at the St2':e lar.d :-.a: r.c v::.:..t.:e ex~<:>::":. a~. F!'"3::.ln; 
(:_; 
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ll:l.nd, were contrary to the facts discovered by Mr. Reimann in the cou::-se of ~is 
investigation. He also advised that because the Robinson land was involved in 
litigation with a lis pendens on record, that the title was not carketable, in 
the fall of 1973 and also in January 1974. After suit was filed, from the in-
vestigation made by Mr. Reimann, I became aware of the fact that privately owned 
lands on the easterly side of the State land had been sold prior to and subsequent 
to 1970 for sumer home sites. 
5. I was in court as a defendant in my capacity of Director of the 
Division o! State Lands on April 5, 1978, when Civil No.6666 was called for 
trial. After opening statements of legal counsel, the Court held a conference 
in cha!Dbers. The Court reco:n:nended that counsel con!er to see if' they could 
resolve the dispute. was present during those con!'erences. There was a discus-
sion on a proposal to have the lands separately appraised by a CO[!Ipetent professiot.-
al appraiser. ~r. Reir..ann stated that the State land is trust fund land a.~d it 
would have to be appraised for its highest and best use market value. :r.e 
recom.:nended Mark H. Crystal. Michael W. Park, attorney for D. Robinson, left the 
conference to confer with his client. When he returned he told us :I. Robinson 
would not consent to having Mr. Crystal act as appraiser. Mr. Park said that 
D. Robinson recommended Ken Esplin of Cedar City. Y.r. ~ei!!iann said he was not 
acquainted with Mr. Esplin, but he was uneasy about having any one from Cedar 
City act as appraiser because he was fearful that D. Robinson would be over to 
Cedar City to campaign Tri th Mr. Esplin to have the State land appraised o~ly as 
valual:lle for ' 1grazing"; that Mr. Robinson had irgued that the State land had 
been ''horribly overgrazed11 and not worth as much as the ?.obinson land; and Pr. 
Reimann said he knew from his investigation conducted for the Attorney General's 
office that the State land was valuable for summer home sites in a scie.r:.ic area 
not far from Brian Head. Mr. Park said we should not worry about Mr. Esplini 
that he was sure 1-~. Esplin would ap?raise all lands at their highest and best 
use market value and not be inflUenced by a.~y one. 
6. VIi th that state!:'lent from ~r. Park as attorney for P.r. Robinson, it 
.,.35 stated th3.t ~~r. :tei:-12.Iln should not object to Ken Esplin. P.r. Rei:!!a."ln said 
t!'lat before mal-:inc- the appraisals ~r. Esplin shoul1 be furnished with a copy of 
the writte:1 sti~ulntion to be si~ned by l<::!?al counsel, defir..inz the duty to 
<.:--na::.se sep.o~:"a":.e~:t each tract accor1::.:1;; to its hi~hest and best use as o! JU!'.e 
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F!o':ir.soi:. land, as rec_uested by ~~r. ?obi.nson. .So::e'::-.ir.g ~_s sa:.d about l::.::i ~l.!lt; 
the tice in which D. Robinson would have to pay the difference tc the State of 
Utah for the difference in a:J;>raised value of the State land over the Robinson land. 
?. After the con:ference of cou:'lsel, after the noon recess, P.r. Park the:J 
dictated into the record a stipulation, but he ooitted some itei::S IJ;'hich haC. been 
a~eed on orally. ~r. Rei!!:ann ti".en dictated into the record the items w~ic!". Vr. 
Park had o::~itted. ~r. ?ark said he would prepare the stipulation. The written 
form of stipulation submitted by ~~ichael W. Park as attorney for plaintiff, di::l. 
not cover everything agreed on orally. Y.r. Reir.lann prepared a form o:f written 
stipulation dated April 24, 19?0, r.hich I a;>p:-oved and it was signed by counsel 
and a copy was :::led in the State Land Office. 
8. About the middle of June, 1978, about two weeY.s before my resi~tion 
as Director of the Division of State Lands became effective, I received a report 
of a telephone conversation Paul E. Reimann had received from Robert L. Gardner, 
assistant attorney general in Cedar City, indicating that Ken Esplin ha::l. not 
valued the State land for any use except for grazing. I did not see a copy of 
the appraisal report of Ken Esplin until the past several days. I discussed with 
Mr. Reimann the question of filing a Clotion to declare the appraisal.s invalid and 
contrary to law; but Mr. Heimann requested that we wait to see if D. Robinson 
paid to the State of Utah the C.i!ferential, as he had only 30 C.ays, eL"ld if he 
failed to pay, the exchans-e would become null and void, a.:l.d there would be no need 
to raise o'tjections to the failure to appraise the State land for its hi~hest and 
best use. 
9. While I was surprised when ~r. Rei!:la.D.n reported on the telephone con-
versation with Jrol.r. Gardner a'!:lout the middle of June 1978, which indicated that 
the State land had not been appraised for a.:oy value except !or grazing, I was 
more surprised whe~. several da:·ts ago I read a copy o! t~e Y.en E:.splin a~';")raisal 
report dated l-':ay 26, 1978. I notice:i th.3.t he rep::-esented or. pa;::e 2 that ,:'his 
aopraisal has been ~a:.e !roo caps, legal desc::-iptio~s, a::-: C.<:. ta :>..::-:-.:s:::ed t·.· :1...~ 
oro"Jerty O?.'!le:"." All lnfo:;;.Jat::.on :ro!:: the State La:1d O!!ice v.:--::(:1": :r..as c~ar'7-e o! 
3tate l.rust fund lan:is, hE..S tc ce cha."lneled th.rou~!'. the J:recto:-. :;: rC.~ow '::;.at 
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-anY ca~aci ty at any title ri th respect to t~e 5 tate la.."ld. in q1.:.es ticn. !u:t~er=or!, 
during the years I served as Director of the Division cf State Lands, ;:-a::ing-. 
was considered the lowest tjpe of use, but lands which were val.uable !or 'ouil:!.in; 
sites, i.D,dustrial sites and !or other uses, frequen:ly were leased for gra.:.ing 
until the Board saw !it to dispose of the surface for the highest and best uses 
to which the land could be devoted. 
10. T!le !act t~at a particular tract has been allo,.,ed to '"" ~ed under 
a grazing lease, does not establish its highest and bes<t; use. Nor does over-
grazing · some tract o! land valuable for farm land or for home sites or 
industrial sites, render such lands useless for far1 land, for home si tea includ-
ing su:~Cer home sites or for industrial uses. Furtht.•rmore, the descriptio!l of 
the State land as having slopes, even steep slopes, which mi~t be ;:~"'r gra:in!' 
ground, might suggest that the land has substantial value as home sites including 
summer home sites by reason of view. Furthermore, it is common lalowledge, tha~ 
in construction of homes, whether in a city or in the mountaiAS, the land is 
scarred and graded, so even i! there is only limited grazing nlue, that does 
not affect the values for higher and best uses to which the land can be adapted, 
I am aware of the fact that many expensive homes have been built on tho foothills 
around Salt Lake City r.hich were poor grazing lands. I note too, that •hilo Mr. 
!:splin recognized that there was subdivision development to the east of tho State 
I 
land, he did not bother to state the infon:>ation on sales of lands comparable to 
the State land in 0uestion. He stated that the State land is not far from ilrian 
Read, a ski resort. I know that there ·~ a considerable amount of opposition to 
the attempts of D. Robinson to get the State land on a trade for grazing land 
in tb.e western part of Iron County, among people in Iron County, because claim 
•as made that the State land was valuable for summer home sitos, being only about 
ll miles from Parowan. I, as the Director, and members o! the Board of State 
Lands, recognized our duties to exercise the highest duty of care fer State Trust 
Fund lands, and not dispose of them !or less than the appraised value !or their 
highest and best uses. ~he Esplin report contradicts the facts, and I regard 
it as incompetent and in disregard of law dealing with trust fund lands in Utah. 
Su~acribed a.":d S':'l"O:':J. to before r.-:e t::Us 29t~ C.ay of Septe~ber, 1976. 
'':r co;-:lS$:c:: e~i::-es 
'I· . n l- ~ ,. 
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S\··':J··r. r-:::scs 2.:1: scy~ 
of Jt.;ly. l97e. maSe repeated ina~o:1n12s in the 8i·:~.sior. o~ Stc:e Lands to 
cscerta1n l'.'he:ner or no: C. Robinson or anyone or, his be he: 7, a: any tir.~e nc:c' 
sent a cneck cr cr.y surr c7 rnoney t~ :ne 8oarC of S:ate :..ands or to tne 
Division of State Lands in 2.~"~Y surr• or amoun: ~·:~tn respec: -cc S:a:e ~anc ~nv::.;·,c: 
1n Civ~.1 7io. 666E in Iron County, Utah. 
l have mede an investigation of the records of this office, incl~.:C/.ns 
receipts o.; mor.ey and also ~ne recor'ds of the suspense accoun~. :~o cheer n;:, ... 
any deoosi: in any sum or amount \,·as rr:ade in any sum or afTIOunt fror said 
C:. ~obinson or frofT' anyone on nis behc:1f, during the period of t..~ ... i1 1972 :o 
the present date. 
Suts:ribed and S\·Jorn before me this 22nd day of September, 1972 . 
. -,_ . _ .. _ r ;·/~ L-
·y Cormiss10r Expires: 10-1-81 
i~atary Puc·1ic, resiCinola:: 
Sa1t Lake City, Utah -
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